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How do we_come to know ourselves? This problem 
has intrigued man for thousands of years. And as .with 
many of the great philosophical questions about the · 
nature of man, social science is starting to provide 
an answer. It seems that "self-awareness, one's abil-
ity to respond differentially to his own behavior and 
it's controlling variables, is a product of social 
interaction" (Bem, 1965, p. 199). One explanation of 
how the social milieu affects our own self-awareness 
is provided by Daryl J. Bern. 
Bern's self-perception theory is relatively straight-
forward. Two propositions comprise the heart of this 
theory: "First, individuals come to 'know' their own 
attitudes and other internal states partially by in-
ferring them from observations of their own overt 
behavior and the circumstances in which it occurs& 
Thus second, to the extent that information from in-
ternal cues is weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, 
the individual is functionally in the same position 
as an outside observer of his behavior, an observer 
who, necessarily, must rely upon those same external 
cues to infer the individual's inner states" (Bern and 
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McConnell, 1970, p. 2J). In other words, "An individu-
al's belief and attitude statements and the beliefs 
and attitudes that an outside observer would make are 
often functi·ona1.ly equivalent in that both sets of 
statements are 'inferences' from the same evidence: 
the public events that the socializing community 
originally employed in training the individual to 
make such self-descriptive statements" (Bem, 1965, p. 
200). 
This theory has received a number of applications. 
First, a number of studies have shown that individuals 
sometimes infer their own emotional states by observing 
external cues in their environment (Bandler, Madaras, 
and Bern, 1968; Berkowitz, Lepinski and Angulo, 1969; 
Davison and Valins, 1969; Kopel and Arkowitz, 1974; 
Misovich and Charis, 1974; Nisbett and Schacter, 1966; 
Schacter, 1964; Schacter and Singer, 1962; Turner and 
Berkowitz, 1972; Valins, 1966; Valins, 1967). Kelley 
(1967) integrated self-perception theory with attribu-
tion theory. Nisbett and Valins (1971) have demon-
strated it's utility in a wide variety of situations 
in v1hich self-inference.s seem to be made from overt 
and autonomic behavior. Lepper ·(1973) has shown the 
applicability of self-perception theory to Freedman 
and Sears' "foot-in-the-door technique." 
However, the most important application of self-
perception theory is to attitude formation and change. 
In terms of attitude formation Bem argues that people 
do indeed on occasion infer their beliefs and attitudes 
from observing their own overt behavior, particula~ly 
when internal cues are w~ak ~nd or ~~iable. 
In terms of_attitude change, Bem has attempted to 
re-interpret the large corpus of cognitive dissonance 
theory findings in terms of self-perception theory. 
There is a heated controversy between dissonance 
theorists an~ self-perception theorists over the valid-
ity of their respective theories. Dissonance theory, 
following Festinger {1957), assumes that individuals 
try to maintain some consistency in their beliefs. 
"Two elements of knowledge 'are in dissonant relation . 
i£, considering these two alone, the obverse of one 
element would follow from the other.' Further, dis-
sonance, 'being psychologically uncomfortable, will 
motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and 
achieve consonance' and 'in addition to trying to 
reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations 
and information which would likely increase the dis-
sonance•• (Zajonc, 1960, p. 190). Simons (1971) es-
timated that over three hundred studies have supported 
predictions derived from this theory. 
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Attitude formation and change obviously constitute 
important areas of study. The most general and most 
supported (in terms of empirical research findings) 
theory of attitude change is cognitive dissonance 
theory. The most important competing theory to dis-
sonance is self-perception theory in tha~ only the 
latter attempts to explain all of the ramifications 
of dissonance theory. There are other competing 
theories (chiefly reinforcement theory) but these are 
only partial in scope. · Therefore, given that attitude 
change constitutes an important area of study, it 
seems highly desirable to know whether the most general 
theory of this process (dissonance theory) or it's 
chief competitor (self-perception theory) is correct. 
There have been many studies conducted in an 
attempt to resolve this controversy. The first one 
was conducted by Bem (1965). In the first part of the 
study, subjects were asked to state that cartoons 
were either "very funny .. or "very unfunny." Each state-
ment was made in the presence of one of two colored 
lights. One of the colored l.ights (the truth light) 
signified that the subject was telling the truth. 
The other light signified that the subject was making 
a false statement {the lie light). After the subject 
made his statement while the light was on, he rated 
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his ••true" attitude on a rating scale. The results 
showed that the ten cartoons commented upon by the 
subjects in the presence of the truth light were ranked 
further from the neutral point in the direction of 
self-persuasion ("very funny" or "very unfunny") 
than the ten cartoons commented upon by the subject 
in the presence of the lie light. Subjects were evi-
dently inferring their beliefs from external cues, 
i.e., the lights. 
In the second part of this study, Bem offered 
an initial alternative explanation for dissonance 
theory results. Bern did not think it was necessary 
or parsimonious to postulate a drive-reduction mech-
anism. Bem suggested rather that if a person behaves 
counter to his attitudes, he will infer what his "true" 
attitudes are from observations of his own behavior 
without experiencing any aversive motivational pres-
sure. Any attitude change "is viewed simply as a self-
judgment based on the available evidence, evidence 
that includes the apparent controlling variables of 
the observed behavior" (Bem, 1967, p. 188). 
Bern sought to find evidence in support of his 
theory by replicating two dissonance experiments within 
what he called his "interpersonal replication" paradigm. 
That is, he assumed that if his interpretation of dis-
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sonance theory was correct, then external observers 
should be able to accurately replicate the attitude 
of one of the original dissonance experiment subjects. 
In the first dissonance experiment, subjects were 
offered either $.50, $1, $5. or $10 to write a coun-
terattitudinal essay. The results showed that attitude 
change was inversely related to level of incentive. 
In the second dissonance experiment, hungry subjects, 
after engaging in a series of tasks, were asked to 
volunteer for further testing. Half of the subjects 
were offered $5 for volunteering, half were offered 
nothing. Subjects were given a posttest on hunger 
after they had volunteered. The results showed that 
those subjects who were offered the money rated them-
selves significantly more hungry than those who had 
volunteered for nothing. In separate studies, Bem 
described these two experiments to external observers 
and asked them what the· original subjects' attitudes 
would have been at the end of the experiments. In 
both cases, external observers were able to closely 
replicate the results obtained from the original 
subjects. From this, Bem concluded· that the judgments 
made by the dissonance subjects regarding their own 
behavior did not differ significantly from judgments 
made by external observers. 
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A follow-up study by Bern (1966) produced similar 
results to the first part of the 1965 study. Subjects 
had to cross· off fifty words on a one hundred word 
list. The list- was taken away. Using a pre-determined 
schedule, the experimenter announced a word and instruc-
ted the subject either to state that he had or had 
not crossed out the word earlier. Half of these 
"confessions .. were true and half were false. The sub-
ject made his "confession". in the presence of either 
a truth light or a lie light. After each confession, 
the subject entered the word onto a sheet of paper and 
indicated on a five-point seal~ how sure he was of 
having crossed out the word or not. The results sho,ved 
that false confessions emitted in the presence of the 
truth light produced more errors of recall than either 
false confessions emitted in the presence of the lie 
I 
light or no control at all. Subjects were also less 
sure of their false confessions when they were made 
under the truth light than when they were made under 
the lie light or no light at all. 
Bem's 1965 reinterpretation of dissonance theory 
results is relatively loose. He made a more rigorous 
presentation in 1967 when his specific purpose was to 
present an alternative explanation for dissonance theory. 
Bern chose to replicate the Fes±inger and Carlsmith (1959) 
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experiment in which subjects who received $1 for engaging 
in counterattitudinal advocacy changed their attitudes 
to match their behavior more than did subjects who 
received $20 for doing the same task. Dissonance 
theory interprets these results by assuming that sub-
jects who state that a dull task is interesting to 
another person for $20 can easily justify their be-
havior in terms of the large reward. Subjects cannot 
justify this lie in terms of $1. Thus they experience 
dissonance (they believe one thing but are arguing 
for another). This dissonance motivates the person 
to move to consonance. The way to do this is to change 
one's attitude to match the behavior, i.e., subjects 
believe that the task was not so boring after all. 
Bem argued that an external observer would repli-
cate these results. If a person sees another person 
making favorable statements about a dull task for $20, 
he will assume that the person does not really believe 
what he is saying, that he is only doing it for the 
money. Consequently, the observer would conclude 
that the individual really thinks the task is dull in 
spite of what he said. If a person says a dull task 
is interesting and is only paid $1 for doing so, 
though, an external observer would be more likely to 
judge the person to be expressing his "true•• attitude 
9 
and hence would infer that attitude from the content 
itself. Bern replicated the Festinger and Carlsmith 
study using his interpersonal replication paradigm. 
He described t~·his subjects the experimental situa-
tion facing one of the participants in the dissonance 
experiment and asked them to predict the participant's 
attitude at the end of the experiment. The results 
were similar to Festinger and Carlsmith's results 
on two separate trials. 
The three studies replicated so far by Bem all 
dealt with the forced compliance paradigm of dissonance 
theory. This paradigm exists when a subject is forced 
by either the promise of a reward or the threat of a 
punishment to argue publicly for a position he does 
not believe in. Bem also sought to replicate a study 
utilizing the free choice paradigm. In this type of 
study, subjects are simply asked to make a choice 
from among a number of alternatives. Dissonance is 
presumably aroused because the rejected choices contain 
positive features that would have warranted their ac-
ceptance, and the chosen alternative contains negative 
features that would have warranted it's rejection. 
To reduce dissonance, subjects are theoretically 
motivated to rate the chosen alternative as more favor-
able than the initial rating and the rejected alter-
10 
natives as more negative than their initial ratings 
after the choice has been made. External observers 
of the subjects in the free choice study also replicated 
the · original subjects' results. Bern offered a theoret-
ical explanation of the selective exposure hypothesis 
of dissonance theory but unfortunately did not replicate 
any of the experiments in this area. 
Judson Mills (1967) criticized the previous study 
of Bem's by noting that Bem did not tell his subjects 
what the initial attitudes of the participants in the 
various dissonance experiments were. Mills argued that 
Bern's subjects could conclude that the person's liking 
for the task determined how much he was paid. Mills 
concluded that "Bem has not shown that naive observ.ers 
can accurately predict the changes in liking for the 
tasks found by Festinger and Carlsmith" (Mills, 1967, 
p. 535) • 
Bem (1967) responded to Mills by arguing that his 
subjects• task was not to predict attitude change, which 
is only a psychological reality to the experimenter 
who can compare experimental groups with control groups. 
Rather his interpersonal simulations reproduced the 
phenomenology of the dissonance experiments from the 
original participants' point of view. And since 
participants' initial attitud~s were not measured in 
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most dissonance experiments (because they were after-
only designs) , Bern obviously could not tell his ob-
servers what they were. Because the original subjects 
had no baseline-· with which to compare their attitude, 
it appears that they had to infer their attitudes 
from their own behavior, even as Bern's external ob-
servers inferred the participants' attitudes from the 
latter's behavior. 
Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna and Brehm (1968) 
leveled the next attack at Bem. Their arguments were 
as follows: 
The descriptions used by Bern suggest that a typ-
ical hypothetical subject would be quite unwilling 
to comply with the experimenter's request in the 
first place. However, the hypothetical subject 
in the description does perform the requested 
behavior. Observers should therefore in£er that 
their subject was atypical and that he was in-
itially more willing to comply than most subjects. 
Further, a subject who complied for a small in-
centive would be seen as more atypical than a 
subject who complied for a large incentive. Our 
alternative explanation asserts that Bern's ob-
server-subjects were not behaving according to 
. 
his self-perception hypothesis, but rather that 
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they merely judged di~ferential hypothetical sub-
ject self-selection. (Jones, Linder, Kiesler, 
Zanna and Brehm, 1968, p. 249) . 
They then presented five experiments showing that ex-
ternal observers could not replicate Bern's results if 
the initial attitudes of the original dissonance sub-
jects were made salient, and that observers could 
accurately predict only when there was no such manipu-
lation. 
Bern (1968) responded to Jones et al. on two levels. 
First, he argued that the previous study in no way 
contradicts self-perception theory. Bern noted that 
both the original dissonance experiments and his replica-
tions had subjects rate an attitude immediately after 
a counterattitudinal behavior. Engaging in such be-
havior may provide such strong cues for the experimental 
subject that any control exercised by the initial 
attitude would be swamped. Therefore, when Jones et 
al. made the initial attitude salient by presenting 
it before the posttest, of course they made Bem's 
replications impossible. But Bem argued that such a 
manipulation would also have ruined the original dis-
sonance experiments. He also noted that the results 
of one of the author's work showed that observers can 
replicate dissonance findings when given the initial 
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attitude if they also can hear the subject engaging 
in the counterattitudinal behavior as well. 
Bern responded second by arguing that interpersonal 
simulations are like computer simulations. The ex-
perimenter must abstract what is significant from the 
original behavior to construct his "program." If the 
wrong .. input statements" are selected, then the sim-
ulation will not succeed in producing ••output state-
ments" that match the original experiment, which is 
all that Jones et al. have demonstrated, according to 
Bern. 
Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna (1969) provided further 
support for the hypothesis that people infer their 
beliefs from their behavior. Subjects were led to 
believe that they were going to deliver arguments 
against air pollution for passers-by ~n the street. 
At the same time, confederates were asked to argue for 
promoting auto safety. The confederate stated that he 
was willing to argue in favor of auto safety either 
because (a) he believed strongly in auto safety 
(belief-relevant condition); or because (b) the. ex-
periment was scientifically valuable (belief-irrelevant 
condition). It was found that belief-relevant subjects 
were more opposed to air pollution than the belief-
irrelevant subjects were. The authors made the fol-
14 
lowing conclusion: 
Mere commitment to proselytizing behavior did not 
cause subjects to believe more strongly in the 
importance of combatting air pollution .... The 
subjects' intentions to proselytize against air 
pollution had nothing to do with their personal 
views on the topic •... It was necessary to intro-
duce a cue of belief relevance for the belief 
inference to occur ...• When a model indicated that 
his intentions to perform a similar task were 
influenced by his convictions, subjects apparently 
assumed that they were similarly motivated by 
their beliefs. (Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna, 1969, 
p. 326) 
Bem and McConnell's 1970 experiment provided em-
pirical support for Bern's (1968) reply to Jones, et 
al. (1968). In this study, the authors found that 
subjects in a typical forced-compliance experiment were 
not only unable to recall their premanipulation at-
titudes correctly, but they actually perceived their 
postmanipulation attitudes as being identical to their 
premanipulation attitudes. In other words, subjects 
in this dissonance experiment did not perceive any 
attitude change. This supported Bern's contention 
that subjects' initial attitudes are not a salient part 
/ 
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of the interpersonal replication paradigm. Subjects 
counterattitudinal behavior appa~ently does cancel out 
any effects of the pretest. 
In all of -the studies reviewed to this point, the 
two theories were not tested in paradigms where the 
two would make different predictions as to the ex-
perimental outcome. Such studies are needed it we are 
to tell which theory is more viable. Fortunately, 
research has been done on the effects of five variables 
about which the two theories make competing predictions. 
The first of these variables is motivation. Cog-
nitive dissonance theorists maintain that dissonance 
causes the person to feel uncomfortable. He is thus 
motivated to reduce the unpleasantness by changing his 
attitude. Self-perception theory maintains that the 
individual simply infers his belief from his behavior 
without experiencing any such pressure. Thus, if it 
can be shown that dissonance is a state that does in-
deed possess motivational properties, self-perception 
theory would suffer a major setback. Six studies have 
shown that dissonance is such a state. 
The first is by Waterman and Katkin (1967). In 
this experiment, subjects wrote a counterattitudinal 
essay. Then they had to learn either a simple or a 
complex task. Since Hull-Spence drive theory predicts 
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that high-drive states have an energizing effect upon 
dominant, well-learned responses, Waterman and Katkin 
predicted enhanced learning of the simple task and 
decreased learning of the complex task. The results 
showed that dissonance-aroused subjects did indeed 
learn the simple task better than control subjects 
but there was no interference with the learning of the 
complex task. Thus dissonance theory predictions were 
only partially upheld. 
Cottrell and Wack (1967) manipulated justification 
for performing a word learning task within a dissonance 
framework. Prior to the task high dissonance subjects 
were told that they would not get promised classroom 
credit for performing the experiment and that the study 
they were participating in was not particularly mean-
ingful. Low dissonance subjects were read a neutral 
passage. Subjects were then required to learn ten 
Turkish words that were presented in varying fre-
quencies to the subjects (i.e., subjects learned the 
words to differing degrees) . The dependent measure 
was the number of times words of each training frequency 
\vere emitted on "pseudo-recognition" trials. On these 
trials, subjects believed they were viewing the words 
subliminally but actually nonsense words were pre-
sented. It was found that, consistent with Hull-Spence 
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drive theory, dissonance enhanced the emission of words 
that had been learned better and reduced the emission 
of words that were not learned as well. 
Pallak, Brock and Kiesler (1967) found in five 
separate experiments that high choice subjects retained 
paired associates words better than did low choice 
subjects. These results are consistent with the dis-
sonance theory prediction that subjects often will seek 
to avoid dissonance by concentrating on the task. The 
authors ruled out the following alternative explanations 
based on data gathered in the five experiments: dif-
ferential rehearsel of the words, anticipation of the 
recall measure, differential attractiveness of the 
words, method of presentation of material, subject 
attrition, variation in the confederate's behavior, 
low choice subject hostility and differential reward 
for participation. It is not known how self-percep-
tion theory would account for these results. 
Waterman (1969) manipulated three variables in a 
2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to either a dissonant or consonant condition 
in which they were either simply committed to or both 
committed to and actually wrote an essay, after which 
they engaged in either a simple or complex word learning 
task. Waterman predicted that if dissonance truly did 
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have drive-arousing properties, then it would enhance 
performance on the simple task and impede performance 
on the complex task. The results showed that, as pre-
dicted, dissonance subjects took fewer trials than the 
consonant group on the simple task and more trials than 
the consonant group on the complex task. The dissonance 
x task interaction was marginally significant, F (1,112)= 
J.79, ~ (.10. In terms of the number of errors made 
while accomplishing the task, the dissonant group made 
fewer errors than the consonant group on the simple 
task and more on the complex task. The dissonance x 
task interaction was significant, F (1,112) = 5.63, 
B <.os. 
The fifth study of dissonance motivation was con-
ducted by Cottrell, Rajecki and Smith in 1974. Forty 
subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects 
ranked twelve consumer items. Half of the subjects 
were required to choose between two closely rated items 
thus experiencing post-decision dissonance, while the 
other half did not do so. All subjects then were 
required to learn ten nonsense words that subjects 
learned at differential levels (some of the words were 
learned better than others). Finally, all subjects 
ranked the twelve consumer items again. Compared to the 
no-dissonance condition, the post-decision dissonance 
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subjects gave more verbal responses of words that they 
had learned better which (according to Hull-Spence 
theory) indicates the presence of increased drive. The 
dissonance subJects also produced the usual dissonance 
reduction results by increasing the desirability of the 
chosen alternative, and decreasing the desirability of 
the rejected alternative. 
Zanna and Cooper (1974) conducted the sixth study 
designed to test the notion that dissonance has arousal 
properties. Two variables were manipulated in a 2 x 3 
design. Subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under 
conditions of high choice or low choice. All of the 
subjects took a pill prior to writing the essay. One-
third of the subjects were led to believe that the pill 
would make them relaxed, one-third believed it would 
make them tense and the final third were led to believe 
the pill would have no effect. The results conformed 
to dissonance theory predictions. In the no-effect 
condition, the standard dissonance effect was found. 
That is, high-choice subjects agreed more with the 
position taken in their counterattitudinal essay than 
did low-choice subjects. In the arousal condition, 
subjects could attribute their arousal to the pill and 
the dissonance effect in terms of attitude change was 
eliminated. In the relaxed condition, the dissonance 
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effect was magnified. The authors reasoned that subjects 
who felt arousal after vrriting the counterattitudinal 
essay despite the fact that they were supposed to feel 
relaxed would find more of a need to change their 
attitudes. Notice that while this experiment does 
support dissonance theory predictions, it does so only 
to the extent that attribution theory (of which self-
perception theory is a special case) is correct. 
Arrowood, Wood and Ross (1970) developed the second 
saarea of competitive prediction when they attempted to 
show that dissonance results would ensue even if there 
was no behavior from which to infer beliefs. Theoreti-
cally, self-perception theory could not account for 
such results. All subjects were told that they would 
prepare to take one of two IQ tests but that only some 
of them would be taking the prepared-for test; the rest 
would be taking the second test, for which their prepara-
tion would be irrelevant. Half of the subjects were 
led to believe that they would have to spend thirty to 
thirty-five minutes memorizing words in preparation for 
the test. The other half of the subjects were led to 
believe that they would simply have to read over the 
words once. The results showed that high-anticipated-
effect subjects were more likely than low-anticipated-
effect subjects to predict that they would \ITite the 
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preparation-relevant IQ test. However, when these 
subjects were asked to predict which test other sub-
jects would take, these results were not replicated. 
In fact, there was no consistent pattern of response. 
The authors interpreted these findings as supporting 
dissonance theory. They reasoned that subjects felt 
aversive motivational pressure themselves to reduce the 
dissonance, pressure that did not generalize to per-
ceptions of others. 
However, Williams, Crawford and Haaland (1974) 
pointed out three problems with the Arrowood, et al. 
study: 
To test self-perception, subjects should not have 
been asked to predict a chance event but, instead, 
asked "Which of the tests do you think he thinks 
he vvill write?" Second, it follows from dissonance 
theory that high effort subjects should have both 
expected and preferred the appropriate test. No 
difference in preference was found. Moreover, 
the running procedure confounded experimenter 
and/or running time with the critical effort 
manipulation. (Williams, Crawford and Haaland, 
1974, p. 319) 
The authors ran a study identical to the Arrowood, 
et al. study but with corrections of the above three 
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errors. The results showed that high effort subjects 
indicated greater anticipated effort than low effort 
subjects. Yet both groups expected their chances of 
getting the preparation-relevant test to be fifty-
fifty. Likewise, both groups predicted that other sub-
jects would also expect fifty-fifty odds. And cant~ 
to dissonance theory predictions, high effort subjects 
preferred the effortless task significantly more than 
low effort subjects. Thus it is questionable whether 
the Arrowood, et al. study gives support to dissonance 
theory over self-perception theory. 
The third variable is the illusion of uniqueness. 
Cooper, Jones and Tuller (1972) conducted a study to 
determine if it makes a difference in terms of2.attitude 
change if the subject thinks he is relatively unique 
in complying with the experimenter's request to partici-
pate in the experiment. In a 2 x 3 design, the ex-
perimenters manipulated the level of incentive ($2. 50 
or $.50) and the perceived uniqueness of subjects. For 
the latter variable, subjects perceived themselves as 
either unique (situational cues indicated that propor-
tionally very few students contacted had volunteered 
to engage in counterattitudinal behavior); non-unique 
(situational cues indicated that proportionately most 
students contacted had volunteered to participate in 
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the experiment); or neutral (there was no mention of 
the compliance rate of other students). The results 
showed the typical effect of incentive in dissonance 
experiments, i.e., $.50 subjects changed their attitudes 
more than did $2.50 subjects in the direction of their 
counterattitudinal behavior. Uniqueness had no signif-
icant effect. The authors interpreted this as being 
evidence against self-perception theory. However, the 
whole experiment was based on a faulty assumption. 
The authors stated that: 
If a subject agrees to perform an attitude-dis-
crepant task and is told that he is virtually the 
only person to comply with the experimenter's 
request, then according to ~elley's attributional 
interpretation (but not dissonance theory), he 
should manifest considerable change in the· direc-
tion of his behavior regardless of the amount of 
incentive he is offered for his compliance. · On 
the other. hand, if the subject is made to believe 
that all persons who were requested to perform the 
task consented to do so, then the attributional 
view would hold that subjects will make an entity 
attribution and be no more in agreement with the 
attitude-discrepant position than subjects in a 
control group. (Cooper, Jones and Tuller, 1972, 
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p. 49) 
Yet two pages back the authors indicated what Kelley's 
position really _i~: 
According to Kelley, when an individual observes 
himself performing a counterattitudinal task in a 
forced-compliance situation, he must decide whether 
to make an entity or a person attribution. He must 
ask himself, "Did I behave this way because anyone 
would have under the circumstances or did I do 
something that very few others would have done?" ... 
The inverse relationship between incentive and 
attitudes is seen as a function of the covariation 
between incentive and the illusion of uniqueness: 
as the incentive for compliance is reduced, the 
illusion of uniqueness is increased. For dissonance 
theory, the illusion of uniqueness is largely 
irrelevant since subjects' attitudes are a func-
tion of their own behaviors and beliefs rather 
than the behavior of others. (Cooper, Jones and 
Tuller, 1972, pp. 47-48) 
Kelley's formulation is that subjects perceive the level 
of incentive and then make an attribution of uniqueness 
dependent upon that perception. There are two reasons 
why this experiment does not constitute a valid test 
of this formulation. First, subjects in this experiment 
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do not make an attribution of uniqueness based upon the 
level of incentive as required by Kelley. The attribu-
tion is based rather on the ratio of acceptance to re-
fusal slips. Second, Kelley defined the attribution 
of uniqueness as being dependent upon the level of in-
centive. Yet in this experiment the two are manipulated 
independently of each other. A more valid test of 
attribution theory would be to force subjects to engage 
in counterattitudinal essay writing and then ask them 
to indicate the percentage of subjects they think com-
plied with the experimenter's request to participate in 
the experiment. This figure should then be compared to 
a similar guess made by subjects who did not engage 
in counterattitudinal essay v~iting. 
The fourth variable about which dissonance and self-
perception theories make . competing predictions is com-
mitment. Kiesler, Roth and Pallak (1974) conducted two 
experiments manipulating commitment to determine whether 
dissonance or self-perception . theory best explained the 
results. In the first experiment, subjects were com-
mitted to reading a speech consonant with their opinions 
either publicly (high commitment) or privately (low 
commitment). After commitment but prior to the reading, 
subjects were given a choice of two tasks to perform. 
The first would make the subject think about how others 
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would react to the content of the recorded speech. The 
second task was a nonsense-syllable one irrelevant to 
the commitment. Attribution theory predicts that sub-
.jects would choose the first task. Selective exposure 
studies suggest that subjects would choose the second 
task. The results showed that as the level of commit-
ment increased, · fewer subject~ chose the relevant task. 
In other words, under conditions of high commitment, 
subjects are unlikely to engage in any behavior that 
would force critical self-examination of one's beliefs. 
Experiment two consisted of two parts. The first 
part simply replicated experiment one. In the second 
part, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
commitment conditions: high, low and none. Prior to 
recording the speech, subjects in the high and low 
conditions had the choice of either completing the same 
boring irrelevant task as used previously in experiment 
one, or a relevant task which allowed subjects to re-
interpret their prior behavior (the commitment) as at-
titudinally innocuous. As predicted, when faced with 
the choice between a dull task and one which forced 
consideration of one's commitment, highly-committed 
subjects chose the irrelevant dull task. However, when 
given a choice between the same dull task and one which 
allowed the innocuous reinterpretation, highly committed 
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· subjects chose the latter. 
The authors were quick to point out that this study 
does not support dissonance theory because consonant 
--
behavior was manipulated in this study, not dissonant 
behavior. 
The authors concluded that several assumptions should 
be added to the process of self-attribution: 
(a) Often attitudes are not well articulated; 
(b) As a result, the attitudinal implications of 
one's actions are often ambiguous to self; and 
(c) When the implications of one's actions could 
be negative, the implications are not passively 
accepted. Instead, one often avoids thinking about 
the implications or strives actively to reinterpret 
the original behavior. Perhaps the cognitive con-
sequences of attributional manipulations do not 
occur until or unless the experimenter forced them 
by asking questions the subject is trying to avoid. 
(I<:iesler, Roth and Pallak, 1974, p. 714) 
The fifth variable is the reinstatement of initial 
subject attitudes. Self-perception theory predicts that 
reminding the subject of his initial attitude would 
eliminate the dissonance effect. 
The failure of Jones et al. to replicate dissonance 
:findings when a conflicting "initial" attitude of 
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the subject is made salient for the observer, sug-
gests that a similar salience manipulation intro-
duced into the original dissonance study just prior 
to the final attitude assessment would similarly 
destroy the original experimental finding. That 
is, the data of Jones et al. can be viewed as 
evidence in favor of our original decision to 
regard the initial attitudes of subjects as non-
salient in their postmanipulation phenomenology, 
and as evidence against the guess of Jones et al. 
that these attitudes are salient. (Bem. 1967, 
p. 271) 
Dissonance theory, on the other hand, predicts that 
there will be even more attitude change in the direc-
tion of the counterattitudinal behavior because subjects 
will be reminded all the more clearly of the contradic-
tion between their attitude and their behavior. 
Harris and Tamler {1971) conducted the first study 
of this issue. In their study, subjects completed a 
pretest on a topic one day during class. One week later, 
when they reported for the experiment, they were 
reminded of \vhat their initial attitude \vas, and then 
\vere aslced to \vri te a counteratti tudinal essay on the 
topic for either $2.50 or $.50. Subjects then completed 
a posttest on the key item. The results showed that 
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there was more attitude change in the low incentive 
condition than in the high incentive condition. The 
authors concluded that dissonance theory was supported 
over self-perception theory. 
The second study of reinstated initial attitudes 
was done by Snyder and Ebbeson (1972). All subjects 
participated in counterattitudinal essay writing. 
There were two independent variables. Two levels of 
choice were manipulated: choice and no choice. There 
were four levels of salience: nothing salient, attitudes 
salient, behavior salient, and both attitude and 
behavior salient. A no-essay control group was included 
as a reference point. The results showed that when 
neither attitudes nor behavior were salient, subjects 
agreed with their . essays more under choice than under 
no choice conditions. Both theories had predicted this 
outcome. When initial attitudes were made salient, 
choice subjects agreed less with their essays and no 
choice subjects agreed more with their essays than when 
initial attitudes were not made salient. Dissonance 
theory predictions were directly contradicted by these 
findings. Self-perception theory was supported by 
. these results, but not for the reasons Bem would have 
cited. Both theories predicted that behavior salience 
would increase the effect of choice. However, the re-
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sults showed that this variable had no effect on final 
attitudes. The authors explained these findings by 
simply extending self-perception theory: 
In self-perception theory, perception of the be-
havior is a constant and choice is thought to 
determine the relevance of the behavior to the 
attitude judgment. In the present approach, 
perception of the behavior is not constant. 
Instead, choice determines perception of the be-
havior which in turn determines the attitude es-
timate. Thus, choice mediates perception of be-
havior rather than (or possibly in addition to) 
perception of attitude. (Snyder and Ebbeson, 1972, 
p. 514) 
Bem (1972) simply reviewed the Snyder and Ebbeson 
experiment, indicated that the results were equivocal 
and noted that Snyder and Ebbeson proposed their own 
model of self-perception. He concluded that the clash 
between dissonance theory and self-perception theory 
was not as important as other unexplored areas of self-
perception theory and that he will have nothing more 
to do with the conflict. 
Ross and Shulman (1973) manipulated two variables 
in a third study of this issue. Subjects had to write 
counterattitudinal essays under conditions of either 
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choice or no choice. They were either shown or not 
shown their initial attitudes (which had been obtained 
a week earlier) immediately before the posttest. The 
results supported- ~he dissonance theory prediction: 
increasing the salience of premanipulation attitudes 
did not reduce the dissonance effect whatsoever. 
Green {1974) also examined the effects of initial 
attitudes upon attitude change within the forced com-
pliance paradigm. However, Green examined the effect 
of the extremity of initial attitudes, rather than 
their reinstatement, upon attitude change. He manipula-
ted two variables in a 2 x 2 design. Subjects were 
assigned to either a high thirst condition or a low 
thirst condition. Subjects were promised either $2.50 
or $.50 to engage in a future water-deprivation ex-
periment. Acc.ording to Green, self-perception theory 
predicts that the extremity of initial attitude should 
have no effect upon attitude change whereas dissonance 
theory predicts that (1) the more extreme the initial 
attitude, the more subjects should change their atti-
tudes in the direction of their counterattitudinal 
behavior; and (2) there should be a significant inter-
action between incentive and extremity of initial at-
titudes. The results supported the dissonance theory 
predictions. 
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Because of the inability of the last four studies 
to resolve the theoretical conflict surrounding re-
instatement of initial attitudes, this author feels 
-.-
that another study of that topic is jusfified. Because 
the Green study does not actually deal with reinstated 
initial attitudes, it will not be considered further. 
The remaining three studies generated contradictory 
results. The Harris and Tamler and Ross and Shulman 
studies supported dissonance theory while the Snyder 
and Ebbeson experiment was largely in support of self-
perception theory. These conflicting findings can be 
explained in part by methodological differences among 
the studies. Each study had a different operational 
definition of reinstated initial attitudes. Snyder 
and Ebbeson operationally defined reinstatement of 
initial attitudes as making subjects think about what 
their attitude was before they wrote their counter-
attitudinal essay. Harris and Tamler defined the vari-
able as showing subjects their pretest score before 
they ¥~ote their essays. Ross and Shulman also 
showed their subjects their pretest scores but did so 
after they wrote their essays but before the posttest. 
Since the latter two experiments both generated .dis-
sonance results, it is possible that it is the manipu-
lation itself rather than when it occurs that is the 
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critical factor. 
The difference between the two manipulations is 
that in the Snyder and Ebbeson experiment, subjects 
- . -
think about their attitudes without making an overt 
behavioral commitment to those attitudes (such as 
w~rking an attitude scale). In the other two experiments, 
subjects do indicate their attitudes on an attitude 
scale pretest. This means that subjects in the Harris 
and Tamler and Ross and Shulman experiments made a 
commitment to their attitudes that the Snyder and 
Ebbeson subjects did not make. 
This difference in the level of commitment in the 
experiments could account for the contradictory find-
ings, particularly in light of the Kiesler, Roth and 
Pallak (1974) results. As noted previously, these 
researchers found that the more committed a subject 
was to his own attitudes, the less likely he was to 
test his beliefs by thinking about them and to undergo 
the belief-inference process. If this analysis is 
correct, then subjects who are simply asked to think 
about their beliefs before engaging in counterattitudinal 
behavior should not generate dissonance results. Sub-
jects who are shown pretests indicating their initial 
beliefs on attitude scales should generate dissonance 
results. 
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More importantly, though, this author believes 
that all of the previous authors have overlooked a 
most important factor in the self-perception process. 
All of them have ignored how certain a subject. is of 
his pretest attitude rating. Let us suppose the fol-
lowing situation: a subject indicates his attitude 
on a seven-point scale but is totally uncertain of what 
his attitude is. He is marking the scale only because 
the experimenter has asked him to do so. He then 
engages in counter-attitudinal behavior, and is shown 
his pretest. He is asked to indicate what his attitude 
is new. It seems obvious to this author that the pre-
test will not affect the attitude inference process 
in this situation because the pretest does not provide 
any valid information for the subject from which to 
make an inference. Given the choice of whether to make 
an inference from an uncertain attitude statement (based 
upon weak internal cues) or a certain behavior (based 
upon strong external cues) the subject will infer his 
belief from his behavior and dissonance results will 
still be generated. 
Only when the subject is certain of his pretest 
rating will reinstatement of that rating interfere with 
the inference-making process. Self-perception theory 
states that a person will infer his beliefs from ex-
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ternal cues only when internal cues are weak. Co~ 
versely, when internal cues are strong, subjects wi~l j 
tend to ignore external cues. Reinstatement of an 
opinion about which one is certain is nothing more than 
the reinstatement of a strong internal cue. Given such 
a cue, subjects will tend to ignore counterattitudinal 
behavior. In other words, dissonance results will not 
be generated in this latter case. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the ef-
fects of topic certainty, counterattitudinal advocacy 
and reinstatement o~ initial attitudes upon attitude 
change, and to determine whether dissonance or self-
perception theory is more parsimonious in explaining 
the results. 
The hypotheses are as follows: 
(1) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude 
salience-pretest cells will evidence significantly 
greater attitude change in the direction of their 
counterattitudinal essays than will subjects in the 
corresponding control group. 
This hypothesis is based on the Harris and Tamler (1971) 
and Ross and Shulman (1973) findings with a possible 
explanation provided by the Kiesler, Roth and Pallak 
(1974) study. 
(2) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude 
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salience-think about/certain topic condition will 
not show any significantly greater attitude change 
in the direction of their counterattitudinal 
essay than will subjects in the corresponding 
control group. 
This hypothesis is based on the Snyder and Ebbeson (1972) 
study and on the author's own analysis of self-perception 
theory as explained previously. 
(3) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude 
salience-think about/uncertain topic condition 
will show significantly greater attitude change 
in the direction of their counterattitudinal essay 
than will subjects in the corresponding control 
group. 
Hypothesis two is the critical one in terms of 
the dissonance/self-perception theory controversy. It 
is based on self-perception theory predictions. A 
failure to support this hypothesis would thus be support 
for dissonance theory. 
Both theories predict hypotheses one and three 
according to this analysis. Failure to support one 
of these hypotheses would thus constitute a blow to 
both theories. 
Method 
Overview of Design 
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This study was a modified 2 x 2 x 4 design. The 
independent variables were topic certainty, counter-
attitudinal advocacy, and premanipulation attitude 
salience. The dependent variable was attitude change. 
See Appendix A for further clarification. 
Subjects 
Eighty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in 
beginning speech courses at Florida Technological 
University served as subjects in this experiment. 
This allowed the assignment of six subjects per cell. 
They participated in the study to fulfill the exper-
imental participation opportunity of the course. 
Independent Variables 
Topic certainty. This variable was opera~ionally 
defined in terms o~ a pilot study. This author made 
up a list of thirty topics that he considered to be 
counterattitudinal for most college students. These 
were presented to twenty-three beginning speech 
students. They rated the topics on two seven-point 
semantic differential scales. The first was an agree-
disagree scale. The second was a certain-uncertain 
scale. The author selected from this list two topics 
that were nearly equally counterattitudinal but as 
widely separated on the certain-uncertain scale as 
possible. There were thus two levels of topic cer-
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tainty: certain and uncertain. The pilot was run 
one week before the actual experiment. To further 
increase the spread between certain and uncertain 
groups, the subjects in the certain group were provided 
with an informative paragraph on their topic to read 
before writing their counterattitudinal essays (in 
cells one through four) or before the posttest {in 
cells five and six). 
Counterattitudinal advocacy. This variable was 
operationally defined in terms of counterattitudinal 
essay writing. Those subjects who experienced the coun-
terattitudinal behavior wrote the essay. Of course, 
those subjects who did not have such an experience 
did not vrrite the essay. There were thus two conditions: 
essay and no essay. 
Reinstatement of initial attitudes. There were 
four levels of this variable. The first corresponded 
to the Harris and Tamler (1971) study. That is, sub-
jects first filled out a pretest on the key topic 
item. They were then shown that score one week later 
immediately after which they wrote the counterattitudinal 
essay. Subjects then completed the posttest. The 
second level corresponded to the Ross and Shulman (1973) 
study. This level was identical to level one except 
that the subjects were shown their pretest score after 
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their essay writing but before the posttest. The third 
level corresponded to the Snyder and Ebbeson (1972) 
study. In this level, subjects were instructed to think 
carefully about their attitude on the topic after which 
they wrote their essay. Subjects then completed the 
posttest. The fourth level was a control condition in 
which there was no attitude salience manipulation. 
Dependent Variable and Manipulation Checks 
The dependent variable was attitude change. It 
was operationally defined in terms of pretest and 
posttest scores. The pretest was identical to the ques-
tionnaire used in the pilot study. The posttest con-
tained the attitude scale for either the certain or 
uncertain topic and in addition contained the fol-
lowing: a semantic differential scale (comfortable-
uncomfortable) to check on the dissonance manipulation; 
a question asking the subjects to indicate what their 
initial attitudes were on the key item; and a semantic 
differential scale (very little-very much) for subjects 
to indicate how much they thought about their attitudes 
before they wrote their essays. These checked the 
dissonance manipulation, how much subjects remember 
their initial attitude, and the premanipulation attitude 
salience-think about manipulation, respectively. The 
topic certainty manipulation was automatically checked 
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since both pretest and posttest contained the certainty 
scale. The attitude salience-pretest manipulation was 
checked by simply observing whether subjects correctly 
recorded their pretest scores on their essays. 
Procedure 
The procedural order is summarized in Appendix A. 
There were four paragraphs of instructions that 
were used in various combinations for all of the sub-
jects. They were as follows: 
Paragraph one. This is a preliminary study of 
university students' attitudes towards various topics. 
Please write in the upper left hand corner of the first 
page the last four digits of your social security num-
ber, and the course and section number. This is 
strictly for data organization purposes within the 
experiment. I will make no attempt to find out who 
any of you are. Indeed, with only four numbers I 
could not do so even if I wanted to. There are thirty 
topics on these sheets. Please notice that there are 
topics on both sides of the sheets. Please read each one 
carefully. After you read each one, you will find two 
scales. First indicate by circling the appropriate 
number how much you agree or disagree with the topicp 
One indicates maximum disagreement, seven indicates 
maximum agreement while four is the neutral point 
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indicating you neither agree nor disagree with the 
statement. The other numbers represent either increasing 
agreement or disagreement. Please consider all of the 
factors for and against each topic before marking your 
answer. After you finish the first scale, indicate 
on the second scale how certain you are of your answer 
on the first scale. Scale markings are similar, with 
one indicating maximum uncertainty, seven maximum 
certainty and four is the neutral point. Please consider 
carefully how much you actually know about each topic 
before marking the second scale. Continue in this manner 
until you have completed all thirty items. It should 
take you fifteen minutes or less to answer all thirty 
items. Are there any questions? 
Paragraph two. This week we are collecting argu-
ments for and against the various positions expressed 
in the previous questionnaire. It has been found that 
one of the best ways to get all of the arguments on 
both sides of an issue is to have people write an essay 
on only one side. So I would appreciate it if you 
would write an essay which argues as convincingly as 
possible that {either the certain or uncertain topic 
was inserted here). Please write it on this sheet of 
paper. You may use the back if necessary. 
Paragraph three. Here are your original ques-· 
42 
tionnaires. Would each of you look on his or her ques-
tionnaire, find the question that · is relevant to the 
topic of the essay, record the number of the question 
--
and your attitude score in the spaces provided below 
to make our computations easier? 
Paragraph four. Before proceeding further, take 
a few minutes to think about and organize your thoughts 
and views on the above stated topic. (At this point, 
several questions were asked suggesting possible dimen-
sions of the topic for the student to consider) . DO 
NOT PROCEED FURTHER UNTIL YOU HAVE FULLY ORGANIZED 
YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS ISSUE. Once you have organized 
your thoughts, then proceed to write the essay. 
The instructions in paragraph one were made up 
by the present author. The instructions in paragraphs 
two and three were taken and modified from the Ross 
and Shulman (1973) study, while the instructions in 
paragraph four were taken literally from the Snyder and 
Ebbeson (1972) study. 
Subjects in cells one, two, five, seven, eight and 
eleven were given the pretest with the instructions in 
paragraph one. One week later, the rest of the experi-
mental manipulations were run. Subjects in cells one 
and seven were shown their pretests and given the 
instructions in paragraph two. They wrote their essay 
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following the instructions in paragraph three. Sub-
jects in cells two and eight simply reversed this 
order. Subjects in cells three and nine received the 
instructions in paragraph four and then wrote their 
essay after receiving the instructions in paragraph 
two. Subjects in cells four and ten received the in-
structions in paragraphs one and two. Subjects in 
cells five and eleven were given the instructions 
in paragraph three. Subjects in cells six and twelve 
got the instructions in paragraph four. Subjects in 
cells thirteen and fourteen were given the instructions 
in paragraph one. 
After all manipulations, all subjects filled out 
the posttest. 
Students were randomly assigned to cells within 
pretest and no pretest blocks. The reason for assigning 
within blocks was that it would have been impossible 
to keep non-pretested students from being contaminated 
if pretested and non-pretested students had been mixed. 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis was run as follows: (a) a t-test 
was run between cells thirteen and fourteen to determine 
if the pretest had any significant effect upon attitude 
change; (b)analysis of variance tests were run on the 
three independent variables to determine main effects; 
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and (c) t-tests were run on the following pairs of 
cell means to test the three hypotheses: 
1. hypothesis one 
a. one and nine 
b. two and nine 
c. five and eleven 
d. six and eleven 
2. hypothesis two - three and ten 
J. hypothesis three - seven and twelve. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Counterattitudinal advocacy. Three separate indices 
indicated that this manipulation was effective. First, 
all experimental subjects who took the pretest dis-
agreed with the two topics. Thus the topics proved 
to be counterattitudinal just as they did in the pilot 
study. Second, all forty-eight subjects asked to write 
counterattitudinal essays did so. And third, dissonance 
theory predicts that v~iting a counterattitudinal essay 
produces drive, an uncomfortable state. Subjects who 
wrote the counterattitudinal essay were significantly 
more uncomfortable than those who did not do so, 
F (1,86) = 12.2329, E <.ool. Thus the counterattitudinal 
advocacy manipulation seems to have been effective. 
Reinstatement of initial attitude. All forty-four 
45 
subjects in the pretest conditions c·opied their pre-
test scores correctly. This manipulation was thus 
effective. The mean for all subjects in the think 
about condition on- the think about scale was 4.00. 
Subjects in this condition wrote longer essays than 
subjects in any other reinstatement condition (see 
Table 6) . An analysis of variance between the think 
about cells versus the other reinstatement conditions 
did not reveal any significant differences, F (1,46) -
.9334, 4.08 critical valus. An analysis of variance 
of the four reinstatement conditions also showed non-
significant differences, although the relationship 
was stronger than the previous one, F (3,44) = 1.7867, 
2.84 critical value (see Table 11). Although the 
latter F-tests did not reveal significant differences, 
this does not mean that the think about manipulation 
was ineffective. Since all of the think about means 
were rather high, it seems more reasonable to conclude 
that non-think about subjects also put some thought 
into their essays, even though they were not specifical-
ly instructed to do so, rather than that the think 
about subjects did not think about their essays. 
Based upon the fact that think about subjects had a 
high think about mean and wrote the longest essays, 
it seems that the think about manipulation was at 
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least marginally effective. 
Topic certainty. The two topics chosen were 
"Alcoholic beverages should be banned from the FTU 
campus," and "Power -plants should be allowed to burn 
high sulfur coal even if more air pollution is created." 
In the pilot study (N=2J) it \vas found that the two 
topics were nearly equally counterattitudinal (means 
of 1.82 and 1.87 respectively on the attitude scale). 
The two topics were the most divergent on the certainty 
scale of the thirty pretested topics (means of 6.00 
and 5.04 respectively). The difference between the 
two topics was just short of statistical significance, 
F (1,44) = ).8274, critical valus of 4.08 (see Table 
12). However, this difference all but disap~eared on 
the posttest for the experimental groups, E (1,86) -
.2943, critical value of 4.00 (see Table 13). The means 
were 6.05 on the certain topic and 5.91 for the un-
certain topic. Thus most of the change was accounted 
for by stud.ents v1ho became more certain about the 
uncertain topic. Since the pilot and the experimenta~ 
groups were all run within one week of each other, and 
no major events occurred during those two weeks that 
would change students' attitudes toward either topic, 
it does not seem that the . subjects' history accounted 
for such a change. It would seem rather that the dif-
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ference was due simply to chance variation. 
Effects on Dependent Variables 
Pretest effects. Comparisons of cells thirteen 
--
and fourteen revealed no significant effects of the 
pretest on the posttest in terms of attitude change. 
The means did not differ significantly on either the 
certain topic, t (6) = .2254, or the uncertain topic, 
t (6) = .2767. Similarly, no significant effects oc-
curred on the certainty scale. The means did not differ 
significantly on either the certain topic, t(6) -
.2926, or the uncertain topic, t (6) = 1.5163. 
Essay length~ There were no significant dif-
ferences in the length of essays between conditions. 
The mean essay lengths between reinstatement conditions 
on the certain topic did not differ significantly, 
f {1,46) = .3854 (see Table 16). These non-significant 
differences were due more to the large within~· cells 
variation than to the lack of variation between cells. 
The range of essay lengths was from fifteen to two 
hundred twelve words. Lengths were widely scattered 
throughout this range, thus indicating that there 
v1as a \Vide variation in the degree to which subjects 
engaged in counterattitudinal behavior. 
Attitude change. No significant main effects were 
found for any of the three independent variables. The 
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difference between certain and uncertain groups was 
very insignificant, F (1,86) - .0396 (see Table 17). 
Surprisingly, there was also no difference in attitude 
scores between essay and no essay groups, F (1,86) = 
.1)24 (see Table 18). Reinstatement of initial at-
titudes also had no significant effect upon attitude 
change, F (2,86) = 1.5540 (see Table 19). Counter-
attitudinal advocacy had no significant effect upon 
attitude change on both the certaip topic, F {1,42) -
.9238 (see Table 20), and the uncertain topic, F 
(1,42) = .J400 (see Table 21). 
Hypothesis one predicted that there would be a 
significant difference between apy group of subjects 
who were shown their pretests and wrote a counter-
attitudinal essay and the appropriate control group 
in terms of their attitude scores. Four cell comparisons 
were made to test this hypothesis. All t-tests were 
..... 
one-tailed. There was a significant difference in the 
meanattitude scores of cells one and four, t {10) = 
1.8J, p (.05. There were no significant differences 
in the other three comparisons: cells two and four, 
t {10) = .1190; cells seven and ten, t {10) = 1.0397; 
and cells eight and ten, t (10) = .6942. Hypothesis 
one was thus only partially confirmed. 
Hypothesis two predicted a 'significant difference 
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between cells three and four. No such difference 
occurred, t (10) = .JJ67. 
Hypothesis three predicted no significant dif-
..... 
ference between cells nine and ten. This was confirmed, 
t (10) = .6099. 
However, these predictions were based upon the 
assumption that cells four and ten would differ sig~· ­
nificantly from their control groups. No such dif-
ferences occurred. Cell four did not differ signifi-
cantly from cell fourteen, t (8) = .8546, and cell 
ten did not differ significantly from cell fourteen, 
t (8) = .)780. Because this assumption was not con-
firmed, none of the hypothesis confirmations may be 
regarded as valid. 
Contrary to the Bem and McConnell (1970) study, 
forty-three out of forty-four pretested subjects did 
remember their pretest scores. 
The only significant findings involving individual 
cell comparisons revolved around cells one and eight. 
Cell one differed significantly from cell four, t 
(10) = 1.8278, ~~.05; from cell five, t (10) = 2.5743, 
E (.05; and from cell two, t (10) = 2.9854, B< .01. 
Cell eight just missed statistical significance in dif-
fering from cells seven and eleven, t (10) = 1.7056, 
for both .comparisons. 
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Discussion 
Both dissonance and self-perception theories seem 
highly inadequate to explain the behavior observed in 
this experiment in -that none of the hypotheses derived 
from these two theories was upheld. 
The main failure that needs to be explained is 
why subjects who wrote counterattitudinal essays, despite 
the fact that they felt very uncomfortable as predicted 
by dissonance theory, failed to change their attitudes. 
This fact is made more graphic by the finding that 
forty out of forty-four pretested subjects replicated 
their pretest scores on both the attitude and certainty 
scales of the posttest. Of the four who changed their 
attitudes, three changed in the direction of their 
essay, while one changed counter to the essay. A 
combination of four factors seems ~to have brought about 
this outcome. The first factor is the extremely wide 
range of both essay length and quality. Due to the 
wide variation in commitment to and actual encoding of 
the counterattitudinal essays randomly distributed 
in the sample, one could only expect a wide variation 
due to chance in attitude change. If attitude change 
scores are randomly distributed in a sample, of course 
no main effects will show up in the data analysis. 
As to why there was such a disparity in essay length 
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in the first place, no satisfactory answer can be given. 
The instructions used in this study were the same as 
those used in the Ross and Shulman study which supposedly 
generated fairly consistent, high quality essays. It 
is hard to accept the suggestion that FTU students 
simply are more obtuse than subjects than subjects 
used in previous dissonance studies. 
Second, most of the subjects in this experiment 
had extreme attitude scores and were quite certain 
of these scores despite the fact that they knew very 
little about either topic, particularly the uncertain 
topic. The fact that subjects knew very little about 
either topic is supported by several qualitative ob-
servations. First, several subjects- refused to write 
the counterattitudinal essay saying that they did 
not know enough about the topic. But they filled out 
the posttest and marked an extreme attitude position 
about which they were quite sure. Second, most of the 
essays were of rather poor quality. Very few arguments 
were devised; those arguments that were presented were 
thinly supported. Third, many subjects who wrote the 
counterattitudinal essay did so only after complaining 
that they did not know anything about the topic. Thus 
the attitude statements obviously constituted strong 
internal cues for most subjects. Given such dogmatic, 
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highly certain extreme attitudes, it does seem likely 
-
that most people would do everything possible to replicate 
their pretest scores. This is at least interpretable 
from a self-perception theory point of view. The more 
committed a person is to his attitude and the stronger 
an internal cue is, the less likely the person is to 
undergo the self-perception process. 
Third, given that the subjects had such certain , 
extreme attitudes, it appears that \ITiting the c ounter-
attitudinal essay was not defined by the sub j ects a t 
the level of their own self-concepts. Both dissonance 
and self-perception theories require subjects to con-
sider the justification f or writing a counterattitudinal 
essay. In this experiment, it is doubtful whether the 
subjects ever got that far. In this case, they simply 
willingly obeyed the experimenter. Many of the· results 
of this experiment t hus can be described as the result s 
of experimental demand. This is also interpretable 
from a self-perception theory point of view. Kiesler, 
Roth and Pallak (1974) noted that sometimes subjects 
must be directed by the experimenter to consider their 
own beliefs in order £or the self-perception process 
to take place. 
And finally f our, subjects may have engaged in 
alternative means to r educe their discomfort other than 
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attitude change. For example,. they may have increased 
their evaluation of the experimenter, increased their 
evaluation of science as a legitimate social enterprise, 
increased their eva~uation of the classroom credit 
they were getting for the experimental participation 
or in some other way justified in their own minds why 
they were writing down arguments in which they did not 
believe. Given that subjects had such certain, extr·eme 
attitudes, it would seem reasonable that they would 
try to maintain their attitude position and change 
something else to reduce their discomfort. 
One expl~ation that does not fully account for 
the results is the self-perception theory claim that 
reinstatement of the initial attitudes ruins the 
"dissonance" ef'fect. This does not explain the lack 
of difference between cells four and fourteen and : 
between cells ten and fourteen. 
The significant differences between cell one and 
the cells around it cannot be explained theoretically. 
The only logical explanation is that the random~assign­
ment of subjects left six subjects in cell one who 
naturally disagreed very much with the topic. In other 
words, some selection effects took place. 
The reinstatement manipulation was based on the 
essay manipulation succeeding. That is, the predictions 
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were that reinstatement of initial attitudes would ruin 
the counterattitudinal manipulation. Since the advo-
cacy manipulation had no effect, it was impossible to 
determine if the re·rnstatement had any effect. 
The certainty manipulation is somewhat weak. 
Further studies need to find a topic that people will 
admit knowing very little about and still find counter-
attitudinal. 
Three suggestions are offered for future research. 
First, when subjects are asked to write a counter-
attitudinal essay, they should be asked to write a 
certain minimum length to guarantee that subjects exert 
some minimum level of effort in writing the essay. 
Second, further work must be done on finding a topic 
that subjects find counterattitudinal but about which 
they are uncertain. And third, the experimenter should 
introduce a cue for the subjects to consider their 
justificatioon for performing the counterattitudinal 
behavior just before the posttest. 
In summary, none of the three experimental hypoth-
eses was confirmed. This was because subjects did 
not change their attitudes after \ITiting a counter-
attitudinal essay even though the writing made them 
uncomfortable. This condition was necessary in order 
to measure the effects of the other two variables. 
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Appendix A 
Summary of Procedural Order 
Topic Cell Pre- One Attitude Essay Attitude Post-
No. test ~iJeek Salience Salience test 
Delay 
Certain 1 X X show X X 
pretest 
2 X X X show X 
pretest 
3 think X X 
about 
4 X X 
5 X X sho\v X 
pretest 
6 thinlt X 
about 
Uncertain 7 X X show X X 
pretest 
8 X X X sho\v X 
pretest 
9 think X X 
about 
10 X X 
11 X X show X 
pretest 
12 think X 
about 
Contl~ol 13 X X 
14 X 
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Tables of Data Analysis 
Table 1 
Mean Comfort Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x · 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Essay No Essay 
Pretest, Pre-essay 4.50 
2.50 
Pretest, Post-essay 5.50 
Think About J.JJ 2.8J 
None 2.33 4.00 
N = 6 for all cells except none/no essay where N = 8. 
Table 2 
Mean Comfort Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Uncertain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Essay No Essay 
Pretest, Pre-essay 4.50 
2.83 
Pretest, Post-essay 4.50 
Think About 4.67 2.67 
None 4.33 2.25 
N = 6 for all cells except none/no essay where N = 8. 
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Table 3 · 
Mean Amount of Thought Scores, Certainty of Topic x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Essay Condition 
Topic Certainty 
Reinstated Initial Attitudes Certain 
Pretest, Pre-essay 
Pretest, Post-essay 
Think About 
None 
N = 6 for all cells. 
Table 4 
2.00 
2.83 
3.67 
3.83 
Uncertain 
3.33 
4.33 
4.33 
4.33 
Mean Certainty Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitudes Essay No Essay 
Pretest, Pre-essay 6.83 
.5.33 
Pretest, Post-essay 4.67 
Think About 6.83 5.83 
None 6.33 6.38 
N = 6 for all cells except none/no essay where N = 8. 
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Table 5 
Mean Certainty Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Uncertain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitude 
Pretest, Pre-essay 
Pretest, Post-essay 
Think About 
None 
Essay 
6.83 
5.JJ 
4.83 
5.67 
No Essay 
6.17 
6.50 
6.00 
N = 6 for all cells except for none/no essay where N = 8. 
Table 6 
Mean Length of Essays, Topic Certainty x Reinstated 
Initial Attitude Conditions Within Essay Condition 
Reinstated Initial Attitude 
Pretest, Pre-essay 
Pretest, Post-essay 
Think About 
None 
N = 6 for all cells. 
Topic Certainty 
Certain Uncertain 
66.00 62.50 
51.17 86 .• 50 
101.00 102.17 
76.33 70.50 
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Table 7 
Mean Attitude Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitude 
Pretest, Pre-essay 
Pretest, Post-essay 
Think About 
None 
Essay 
1.17 
) .00 
2.83 
3 .33 
I'·Io Essay 
2.JJ 
2.17 
2.13 
N = 6 for all cells except none/no essay where N - 8. 
Table 8 
Mean Attitude Scores, Counter attitudinal Advocacy x 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Uncertain Topic 
Counterattitudinal Advocacy 
Reinstated Initial Attitude Essay No Essay 
Pretest, Pre-essay 1.30 
1.50 
Pretest, Post-essay 2.83 
Think About 2.67 J.8J 
None 2.17 2 38 
l'l = 6 for all cells except none/no essay where N - 8. 
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Table 9 
One-way Analysis o~ Variance, Comfortable Scale, 
Essay v. No Essay 
source ss d~ rrs Computed F Tabled 
between 40.2561 1 40.2561 12.2329* 12.0 
within 28).0167 86 3.2908 
total 323.2728 87 
*p < .001 
Table 10 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Think 
About Scale, Think About Cells v. All Otners 
source ss df IfJ) Computed F Tabled 
between 2.7778 1 2.7?78 
-9334 4.08 
within 1)6.8889 46 2.9?58 
total 139.666? 4? 
Table 11 
F 
F 
One-way Analysis o£ Variance, Think About Scale, Between 
Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels, Tonics Collapsed 
source ss df 
between 15.1666 3 
within 124.5001 44 
total 139.6667 47 
MS Computed F Tabled F 
5.0555 1.7867 
2.8295 
2.84 
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Table 12 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Certainty Scores, 
Certain v. Uncertain Groups, Pilot 
source ss ·err 1\':S Computed F Tabled F 
between 10.5.217 1 10.5217 3.8274 4.08 
within 120.9566 44 2.7490 
total 131.4783 45 
Table 13 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Certainty Scores, 
Certain v. Uncertain Groups, Experimental 
source · ss df MS Computed F Tabled F 
between .4091 1 .4091 .2943 4.00 
within 119.5455 86 1.3900 
total 119.9546 87 
Table 14 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Essay Length, Certain 
Topic, Between Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels 
source ss df rJlS 
between 7915.4582 3 2638.4860 
within 38382.1668 20 1919.1083 
total 4629?.6250 23 
Computed F Tabled F 
1.3748 3.10 
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Table 15 
One-way Analysis of ~ariance, Essay Length, Uncertain 
Topic, Between Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels 
source ss . -·- - df WIS Computed F Tabled ·F 
between 5576.5000 3 1858.8333 2.6200 3.10 
within 
total 
source 
14189.3334 20 709.4666 
19765.8334 23 
Table 16 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Essay Length, 
Certain x Uncertain Groups 
ss df r~1s Computed F Tabled 
between 55J~5208 1 553.5208 .3854 4.08 
within 
total 
66063.4584 46 1436.1621 
66616.9792 47 
Table 17 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change, 
Certain x Uncertain Groups 
F 
source ss df MS Computed F Tabled F 
between .1023 1 
within 221.6137 86 
total 221.7160 87 
.1023 
2.5769 
.0396 4.00 
source 
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Table 18 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change, 
Essay x No Essay 
ss - --df filS Computed F Tabled 
between .)410 1 .3410 .1324 4.00 
within 221.3750 86 2.5741 
total 221.7160 87 
Table 19 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change, 
F 
Pretest x Think About x None Reinstatement Levels 
source ss df MS • Computed F Tabled F 
. 
between 7.8211 2 3.9105 1.5540 3.15 
within 21J.e949 85 2.5164 
total 221.7160 87 
Table 20 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change, 
Essay v. No Essay, Certain Topic 
source ss df ~JiS Computed F Tabled F 
between 2.8189 1 2.8189 .9238 4.08 
within 128.1584 42 3.1513 
total 130.9773 43 
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Table 21 
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change, 
Essay v. No Essay, Uncertain Topic 
source ss .. -df ~JIS Computed F Tabled 
between .7280 1 .7280 .)400 4.08 
VIi thin 89.9084 42 2.1406 
total 90.6364 43 
F 
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